The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) implies that QM is a contextual theory and that the probability measures associated with quantum states do not satisfy the assumptions of Kolmogorov's probability theory. These features of QM are shared nowadays by other scientific theories, as some quantum-like models of cognitive phenomena. We aim to show that contextuality may lead to explain non-Kolmogorovian probabilities in Kolmogorovian terms by referring to a class T of theories in which entities, states, properties and contexts play a basic role. To this end we introduce a propositional language L whose propositions embody a reference to microscopic contexts (µ-contexts), a classical probability measure on the set of all propositions of L and a family of classical probability measures on sets of µ-contexts, each element of the family corresponding to a.macroscopic measurement context associated with a measurement procedure. This classical framework characterizes a subclass T µMP ⊂ T of theories in which mean conditional probabilities on a subset of propositions of L and q-probabilities on the set of all properties can be defined which admit an epistemic interpretation but generally do not satisfy Kolmogorov's axioms. If one maintains that QM belongs to T µMP , then quantum probabilities can be interpreted as examples of qprobabilities, which shows that they can be obtained as derived notions in a Kolmogorovian framework whenever contextuality is taken into account, explains how they can be non-classical and provides them with an epistemic interpretation. As a by-product, the distinction between compatible and incompatible properties is explained in a natural way, and purely theoretical classical conditional probabilities are shown to coexist with empirically testable quantum conditional probabilities.
Introduction
Probability enters quantum mechanics (QM) via Born's rule and is usually interpreted in terms of frequencies of the outcomes obtained when measurements are performed. However, it turns out to be non-Kolmogorovian, in the sense that the probability measures associated with quantum states do not satisfy the assumptions of Kolmogorov's probability theory. In particular, the set of events for every probability measure associated with a quantum state is the orthomodular lattice of standard quantum logic (QL), which is nondistributive (except for some special cases), at variance with the set of events in Kolmogorov's theory, which is a Boolean lattice.
Another well known nonclassical feature of QM is the doctrine that, whenever a physical system in a given state is considered, a quantum observable generally has not a prefixed value but only a set of potential values, and that a measurement actualizes one of these values, yielding an outcome that depends on the specific measurement procedure that is adopted (contextuality). This doctrine is usually maintained to be proven correct by some "no-go" theorems that supply a mathematical support to the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of QM and show, in particular, that contextuality occurs also in the case of measurements on far-away subsystems of a composite physical system (nonlocality). This, according to Einstein's view, either means that QM is an incomplete theory or implies a "spooky action at a distance" (hence the famous "EPR paradox"). 1 Because of contextuality, it is a widespread belief that quantum probability measures do not admit an epistemic interpretation (the term epistemic is meant here in a broad sense, i.e., as referring to our degree of knowledge/lack of knowledge). Indeed, generally one cannot consider a property of a quantum system as either possessed or not possessed by the system independently of any measurement, even if the state of the system is known. Hence one cannot look at the values of the probability measure associated with the state as indexes of the degree of ignorance of the properties possessed by the system. Probability should rather be seen as an intrinsic feature of the microworld, which leads to classify it as ontic.
The standard view expounded above is obviously legitimate, but further investigation on the links between quantum probability and contextuality may suggest alternative views. We intend to inquire into these links in the present paper from a general point of view, that is by considering a class T of theories in which the basic notions of physical system (or entity), state, property and macroscopic context are introduced. Hence we will refer to the mathematical machinery of QM only when dealing with the special case of this theory. 2 At the best of our knowledge, our approach is innovative, as it focuses on the analysis of the basic language of the theories in T, thus adopting a methodology that is typical of analytic philosophy but rather unusual in physics. Let us therefore summarily describe it.
First of all, after some epistemological and physical preliminaries (Sections 2 and 3, respectively), we work out in Section 4 a propositional language L that, for every T ∈ T in which every macroscopic context can be associated with a set of microscopic contexts (µ-contexts), formalizes a fragment of the natural language expressing basic features of the entities considered in T . The set of elementary (or atomic) propositions of L is partitioned into a subset of atomic state propositions and a subset of atomic context-depending propositions. A proposition of the former subset affirms that an entity H of T is in a given state. A proposition of the latter subset affirms that an entity H of T possesses a given property in a given µ-context (we stress that no atomic proposition assigning a property of H without referring to a µ-context exists in L). Then we select a subclass T µMP ⊂ T by introducing a classical probability measure on the set of all (atomic and molecular) propositions of L (Section 5) and a family of classical probability measures defined on subsets of µ-contexts (Section 6), each element of the family corresponding to a measurement procedure that determines a macroscopic measurement context associated with a property. We can thus define a notion of compatibility in the set of all properties of L, hence a notion of testability in the set of all propositions of L, and use the foregoing classical probability measures conjointly to define the notion of mean conditional probability on the subset of all testable propositions, together with the related notion of mean probability test. Hence mean conditional probabilities admit an epistemic interpretation, but are not bound to satisfy Kolmogorov's axioms, because they are obtained by averaging over classical probability measures.
Based on the definitions and results expounded above we focus (Section 7) on the set E of all properties, on which a family of mappings E −→ [0, 1] can be introduced by means of mean conditional probabilities, parametrized by the set S of all states. This family induces a preorder relation ≺ on E. We show that, if suitable structural conditions are satisfied, each element of the family is a generalized probability measure (or q-probability) on (E, ≺), which reduces to a classical probability measure whenever (E, ≺) is a Boolean lattice. Generalized probability measures can be empirically tested and admit an epistemic interpretation, but generally do not satisfy Kolmogorov's assumptions. Moreover, they allow the definition of a new kind of conditioning that refers to a sequence of 2 A valuable "contextual approach to quantum formalism" has been provided by Khrennikov (2009a Khrennikov ( , 2009b in the framework of the "Växjö school". This approach, however, is basically different from ours. Khrennikov considers indeed contexts "as a generalization of a widely used notion of preparation procedure" (2009b), which includes also selection procedures that are registration procedures in the sense of Ludwig (1983) . In our approach, instead, macroscopic measurement procedures are associated with macroscopic measurement contexts, which seems to be compatible with Khrennikov's view, but an essential role is played by microscopic contexts underlying macroscopic measurement contexts, which are not considered by Khrennikov. measurements and is conceptually different from classical conditioning.
We are thus ready to discuss the implications of our framework in some special cases, such as classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM) and QM, that can be maintained to belong to T. Leaving apart SM for the sake of brevity, we firstly show in Section 8.1 that all the notions introduced above collapse into familiar notions in CM, consistently with the non-contextual character of this theory. Then we consider QM in Section 8.2 and attain the following results.
(i) The probability measures on the set of properties induced by the Born rule in QM can be considered as the specific form that q-probabilities take in QM. Hence they are interpreted as derived notions within a Kolmogorovian framework and their non-classical character can be explained in classical terms. This explanation implies that quantum probability can be provided with an epistemic rather than an ontic interpretation by taking into account µ-contexts.
(ii) The quantum relation of compatibility on the set of all physical properties can be considered as the specific form that the relation of compatibility introduced in the general framework takes in QM.
(iii) The conditional probability usually introduced in QM can be considered as the specific form that the new kind of conditioning introduced in the general framework takes in QM. 3 Finally, we close our paper with some conclusive remarks (Section 9), and then add an Appendix. This addition is motivated by the fact that the notions of mean conditional probability and mean probability test are conceptually similar to the notions of universal average and universal measurement, respectively, introduced by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (see, e.g., 2014 Bianchi (see, e.g., , 2017 . In particular, in the case of QM our approach provides a description of the measurements testing probabilities that reminds the proposal of these authors. 4 But there are also some relevant differences between the two approaches (in particular, quantum probability is considered as ontic by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi, while we prove in the present paper that it also admits an epistemic interpretation, as explained above). Our Appendix therefore aims to provide a brief and intuitive account of the aforesaid similarities and differences. 3 The results (i)-(iii) have been anticipated in a recent paper (Garola, 2018) . In the present article we propose a more general view by replacing, in particular, the predicate language introduced in the previous paper with a propositional language L. This replacement allows us to avoid referring to individual objects and to consider only tests of probabilities. When dealing with QM we can thus refer to a minimal (statistical) interpretation of this theory (see, e.g., Ballentine, 1970; Busch et al., 1996) , so that our results are not restricted to an interpretation that is "realistic" in the sense explained above. Individual objects are here called into play only to supply an elementary model of probability tests that is closer to physical intuition. 4 We stress that our general framework does not constitute a hidden variables theory for QM, at least in a standard sense. Indeed, µ-contexts are associated (generally many-to-one) with macroscopic measurement procedures, not with states or properties of the entity that is being measured. Our perspective reminds instead Aerts' hidden measurements approach (1986).
Epistemological preliminaries
According to the epistemological view called standard epistemological conception, or received view (see, e.g., Braithwaite, 1953; Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966) , a fully-developed physical theory T is in principle expressible by means of a metalanguage in which a theoretical language L T , an observational language L O and correspondence (or epistemic) rules R C connecting L T and L O can be distinguished. The theoretical apparatus of T , expressed by means of L T , includes a mathematical structure and, usually, an intended interpretation which is a direct and complete physical model of the mathematical structure (this model is often anticipated by the choice of the nouns of the theoretical terms and it is not indispensable in principle, but plays a fundamental role in the intuitive comprehension, justification and development of the theory; think, e.g., to the trajectories of point-like particles in CM or to the geometrical representation of electromagnetic waves). The observational language L O describes instead an empirical domain, hence it has a semantic interpretation, so that the correspondence rules R C provide an empirical interpretation of the mathematical structure. Such an interpretation, however, is often complicate and/or problematic (e.g., one-dimensional orthogonal projection operators may represent both a pure state and a dichotomic observable in QM, i.e., different physical entities). Moreover, it is generally indirect, in the sense that there are theoretical entities that are connected with the empirical domain only via derived theoretical entities, and incomplete, in the sense that only limited ranges of values of the theoretical entities are interpreted (e.g., self-adjoint operators correspond in QM to measuring apparatuses whose outcomes match the eigenvalues of the operators only in finite intervals of the real axis).
The received view has been criticized by some authors (see, e.g. Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1975) and is nowadays maintained to be outdated by several scholars. Nevertheless, we deem that its basic ideas are still epistemologically relevant. In particular, this view led us to focus our attention on the languages of physical theories, suggesting to explore their similarities and differences by analysing their syntax and semantics to find out the roots of several open problems in the foundations of such theories. The results that we have obtained following that suggestion are sometimes unexpected and challenge well established beliefs (see, e.g., Garola and Sozzo, 2013; Garola et al., 2016; Garola, 2017; Garola, 2018) .
We add that in the standard language of physical theories the distinctions introduced by the received view are usually overlooked, and the various linguistic components are mixed together (e.g., the term "observable" may denote in QM a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert space H, and in this sense it belongs to L T , but also a physical entity associated with a set of measurement procedures, and in this sense it belongs to L O ; the term "state" may denote a vector of H, but also a physical entity associated with a set of preparing procedures; etc.). Only a rational reconstruction of the language of a theory can lead to clearly distinguish the various elements that occur in it according to the received view. For the sake of simplicity we therefore retain here some of the basic ideas of such view that we consider epistemologically relevant, but adopt a simpler scheme. To be precise, we maintain that every advanced scientific theory T is expressible by means of a fragment of the natural language enriched with technical terms and is characterized by a pair (F, I), with F a logical and mathematical formalism that may have an intended interpretation and I an empirical interpretation, indirect and incomplete in the sense explained above, that establishes connections between F and an empirical domain. Moreover, in some locutions (as "the minimal interpretation of QM", etc.) the interpretation I will be distinguished from the theory, following a standard use.
Physical preliminaries
The main ideas for our general treatment are suggested by a typical case of contextual theory, i.e. QM. Therefore we consider this theory in the present section. For the sake of intuitivity we refer here to the "realistic" interpretation of QM mentioned at the end of Section 1, according to which QM deals with individual objects and their properties, even if our general theory avoids referring to individual objects, as anticipated in Section 1. Moreover, we adopt a standard physical language in which the distinctions emphasized in Section 2 are not explicitly introduced.
First of all we recall that in most presentations of QM the notions of physical system, or entity, (physical) property and (physical) state are fundamental, and that, according to some known approaches to the foundations of QM (see, e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981; Ludwig, 1983) , states are interpreted as classes of probabilistically equivalent preparation procedures, or preparing devices, and properties as classes of probabilistically equivalent dichotomic (yes-no) registering devices. This interpretation suggests an intuitive explanation of the fact that QM yields only probabilistic predictions. Indeed, one can adopt a picture according to which a microscopic world underlies the macroscopic world of our everyday experience and note that there are two possible sources of randomness for the outcomes of a measurement, as follows (see also Khrennikov, 2015) .
(i) When an individual object is prepared by activating a preparation procedure associated with a state S, we control only macroscopic variables, not the physical situation at a microscopic level. Thus different individual objects produced by the preparation procedure are not bound to possess the same properties.
(ii) When a registering device is activated to perform a measurement, many microscopic contexts can be associated with it, and different microscopic contexts that we cannot control may affect in different ways the outcome of the measurement.
The picture above, however, does not distinguish QM from SM. This crucial distinction can be established as follows. Consider a preparation procedure π in the class S. When activated, π produces an individual object x (which can be identified with the act of activation itself if one wants to avoid ontological commitments). Hence, after the activation a sentence that affirms that x is in the state S is true and a sentence that affirms that x is in a state S ′ = S is false. Then, given an individual object x in the state S, activating a registering device r in the class E tests whether the property E is possessed or not by x, but the result of the test generally depends on the set of properties (pairwise compatible and compatible with E) that are tested together with E. It follows in fact from some known proofs of Bell's and Kochen-Specker's theorems mentioned in Section 1 (see, e.g., Greenberger et al., 1990; Mermin 1993 ) that, if the laws of QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation, the outcome that is obtained depends on the set of the registering devices that are activated together with r, i.e., on the macroscopic context C m determined by the whole (macroscopic) measurement m that is performed. Briefly, QM is a contextual theory. 5 Contextuality means that it is impossible in QM to assign a truth value to a sentence stating that x has (or possesses) a property E disregarding the measurement context. In other words, the natural everyday language and the technical language of classical physics, whose elementary sentences state properties of individual objects independently of any observation, are unsuitable for QM (which is the source of most "quantum paradoxes" in our opinion). This fundamental feature of QM was clearly implicit in Bohr's olistic view (see, e.g., Bohr, 1958) or in Heisenberg's distinction between "potential" and "actual" properties (see, e.g., Heisenberg, 1958) , but it was maintained to be definitively "mathematically proven" only after the statement of Bell's and Kochen-Specker's theorems quoted above. 6 At first sight one can think that a possible answer to the problems raised by the contextuality of QM is assuming that the basic language of QM is the nonstandard logic of quantum propositions introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) , which implies a nonclassical notion of truth (quantum truth) ac- 5 We have emphasized in some previous papers (see, e.g., Garola, 1999; Garola and Pykacz, 2004; Garola and Sozzo, 2010; Garola and Persano, 2014 ) that the epistemological clause "the laws of QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation" is essential in the proofs of Bell's and Kochen-Specker's theorems. Nevertheless, this clause generally is not explicitly noticed or stated, possibly because it seems to be unquestionably justified by the outstanding success of QM. Yet it must be observed that all the proofs mentioned above proceed ab absurdo, considering physical situations in which noncompatible physical properties are assumed to be simultaneously possessed by an individual object and showing that this assumption leads to contradictions with well established quantum laws. But in the aforesaid situations the quantum laws that are applied can never be simultaneously tested, hence hypothesizing that they hold anyway seems more consistent with a classical than with a quantum view. One can therefore try to give up the aforesaid clause, but then the proofs of Bell's an Kochen-Specker's theorems cannot be completed. This conclusion opens the way to the attempt at recovering noncontextual interpretations of QM (see, e.g., Garola et al., 2016) . The arguments in the present paper, however, apply to every theory in which contexts can be defined, irrespective of whether the results of measurements are context-depending (locally, or also at a distance) or not. 6 We stated in footnote 5 that Bell's and Kochen-Specker's theorems rest not only on standard assumptions (often called "realism" and "locality") but also on a further hypothesis that usually remains unnoticed, hence it is implicitly accepted, even if, in principle, it could be rejected. Of course, its rejection would lead to question the contextuality of QM. We however adhere to the standard view in the present paper.
cording to some autors (see, e.g., Rédei, 1998; Dalla Chiara et al., 2004) . But this answer does not grasp the point in our opinion. Indeed, we have proven in some previous papers that quantum logic can be embedded (preserving the order but not the algebraic structure) into a classical logic (Garola, 2008; Garola and Sozzo, 2013) or into a pragmatic extension of classical logic (Garola, 2017) . Moreover, these results are supported by some former results that show that there are examples of classical macroscopic systems that exhibit a quantum structure (see, e.g., Aerts, 1999) .
On the other side, one can maintain that contextuality, implying a breakdown with a classical view of the world, is a fundamental feature that should be incorporated into the basic language of QM rather than recognized at a later stage. By associating this idea with the above picture of the sources of randomness in QM, we observe that, generally, the macroscopic context C m determined by a macroscopic measurement m may be produced by many different microscopic physical situations that cannot be distinguished at a macroscopic level (though they can be described, in principle, by QM itself). Hence we can associate C m with a set C m of microscopic contexts (µ-contexts; of course, C m could reduce to a singleton in special cases) and then assume that the truth value of a sentence asserting that x possesses the property E generally depends on m through the µ-context that is realized when m is performed. But we cannot know this µ-context, hence only a probability can be given which expresses our degree of ignorance of it (we naively argue here as though the set C m were discrete, to avoid technical complications).
Summing up, our picture leads us to conclude that a truth value can be assigned consistently with QM only in the case of a sentence asserting that an individual object x possesses a property E in a given µ-context c, not in the case of a sentence simply asserting that x possesses a property E. Moreover, in general this value cannot be deduced from the laws of QM, which are probabilistic laws that make no explicit reference to contexts.
The conclusions above have an important consequence. Every quantum prediction concerns probabilities, hence in our present perspective testing it requires evaluating frequencies of outcomes. A typical test of this kind consists in preparing a broad set of individual objects in a given state S and then performing on each object the same macroscopic measurement m by activating one or more (compatible) registering devices. The macroscopic context C m then is the same for every individual object, but the µ-context c ∈ C m generally changes in an unpredictable way. Thus we meet two distinct sources of randomness. The first is the state S (be it a pure state or a mixture) that may not determine univocally the properties of an individual object in QM, even if the µ-context c is given (see (i) above). The second is the unpredictable change of the µ-context that occurs when performing m on different individual objects. Hence, even if we could fix the µ-context c ∈ C m , when iterating m we would generally obtain different results, so that for every property E we could evaluate a frequency approaching (in the large numbers limit) the probability that an individual object in the state S possesses the property E in the µ-context c. But we cannot control c, which may change in every round. By assigning a probability to every c ∈ C m , we conclude that the frequencies that are obtained actually approach the mean over C m of the probabilities defined above. It is then reasonable to identify this mean with the quantum probability of E in the state S, which implies that quantum probabilities take simultaneously into account both the sources of randomness listed above. We will see in the next sections that this idea, together with contextuality, can explain the non-Kolmogorovian character of quantum probabilities, together with the rather surprising fact that their values neither depend on µ-contexts nor on macroscopic contexts (see, e.g., Mermin, 1993) . To avoid unnecessary restrictions of our framework, however, we will not refer in the following to individual objects and consider only measurements directly testing probabilities, consistently with the minimal interpretations of QM (see footnote 4).
The formal language L
Bearing in mind the epistemological and physical preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.1. We denote by T the class of theories in which the notions of entity, property and state are explicitly introduced, together with a notion of measurement (hence, implicitly, of macroscopic context). We then denote by T µ ⊂ T the subclass of theories in which each macroscopic context can be associated with a set of microscopic contexts ( µ-contexts).
Examples of theories in T µ are CM, SM and QM, but T may contain also nonphysical theories, such as the models in cognitive sciences that use a quantum formalism (see, e.g., Aerts et al., 2015; . Moreover, we implement the idea of incorporating contextuality in the basic language of a contextual theory T ∈ T µ by constructing a formalized language L that is intended to provide a rational reconstruction of the basic language of every T ∈ T µ (hence L can be considered as a part of the formalism of T ). To this end we agree to use standard symbols in set theory and logic. In particular, c , ∩, ∪, ⊂, \, ∅ and P(Ψ) will denote complementation, intersection, union, inclusion, difference, empty set and power set of the set Ψ, respectively. Furthermore N will denote the set of natural numbers.
Definition 4.2. We call entity the triple H=(E, S, C), where E, S and C are disjoint sets whose elements we call properties, states and µ-contexts, respectively. Then, a basic language L for H is a classical propositional language, constructed as follows.
Syntax.
(ii) Connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or).
(iii) Parentheses (,).
(iv) A set Π of atomic and molecular propositions of L, obtained by applying recursively standard formation rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every
(where t stands for true and f for false) that satisfies the standard (recursive) assignment rules of classical logic (to be precise, let
We note explicitly that the last clause in the definition of w is suggested by the interpretation of states as equivalence classes of preparation procedures (see Section 3).
The logical preorder and the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L can then be introduced in a standard way, as follows.
Definition 4.3. We denote by < and ≡ the (reflexive and transitive) relation of logical preorder and the relation of logical equivalence on Π, respectively, defined by standard rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every A, B ∈ Π, A < B iff, for every w ∈ W , w(B) = t whenever w(A) = t, and A ≡ B iff A < B and B < A). Moreover we put Π ′ = Π/ ≡ and denote by < ′ the partial order canonically induced by < on Π ′ . Then (Π ′ , < ′ ) is a boolean lattice (the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L) whose operations ¬ ′ , ∧ ′ ,∨ ′ are canonically induced on Π ′ by ¬, ∧, ∨, respectively).
As stated in Definition 4.2, the language L is a classical propositional language. Its interpretation, however, introduces some innovative features. Indeed the words state, property and µ-context occur in Definition 4.2 just as nouns of elements of sets, but obviously refer to an empirical interpretation that makes such elements correspond to empirical entities denoted with the same nouns. Then, a state S is associated in L with a state-proposition α S that is argument of truth assignments and is interpreted as "the entity H is in the state S" (at variance with known views in quantum logic that consider states as possible worlds of a Kripkean semantics; see, e.g., Dalla Chiara et al., 2004) . A property E is associated instead with a family {α Ec } c∈C of context-depending propositions of L, where α Ec is argument of truth assignments and is interpreted as "the entity H possesses the property E in the µ-context c".
Remark 4.1. Our physical preliminaries in Sect. 3 are based on an interpretation of QM showing that there may be theories in T that have individual objects and their properties as referents. In such theories each truth assignment could be associated with a set of individual objects that are in a given state and possess the same context-depending properties. Hence one could modify the language L by considering every A ∈ Π a as a monadic predicate rather than a proposition, and introducing individual variables to be interpreted on individual objects. This choice would make our construction more intuitive, and has been done in a previous paper (see footnote 4). Nevertheless we avoid referring to individual objects here and in the following because of the reasons expounded at the end of Section 3. 5 A µ-contextual probability structure on L Following Williamson (2002), we introduce now a probability measure on L by means of the following definitions and propositions.
Definition 5.1. Let A ∈ Π. Then, we set
and say that Ext(A) is the extension of the proposition A.
We stress that the extension of a proposition A generally depends on the µ-contexts that occur in the formal expression of A.
Proposition 5.1. The mapping Ext satisfies the following conditions: Moreover, the algebraic structure Θ = (Ext(Π), c , ∩, ∪) is a Boolean algebra isomorphic to (Π ′ , ¬ ′ , ∧ ′ , ∨ ′ ).
Proof. Straightforward from Definitions 4.1, 4.2 and 5.1.
Definition 5.2. Let Φ = (W, Θ, ξ) be a classical probability space, 7 let Π + ⊂ Π be the set of propositions such that, for every B ∈ Π + , ξ(Ext(B)) = 0, and let p be a binary mapping such that
.
We say that the pair (Φ, p) is a µ-contextual probability structure on L and that p (A | B) is the µ-contextual conditional probability of A given B. Moreover, whenever Ext(B) = W we say that p (A | B) is the µ-contextual absolute probability of A and simply write p(A) in place of p(A | B).
The terminology introduced in Definition 5.2 (where the word µ-contestual emphasizes that probabilities depend on µ-contexts through the propositions of L) is justified by the following statement.
Proposition 5.2. Let B ∈ Π + . Then, the mapping
satisfies the following conditions. (i) Let A ∈ Π be such that Ext(A) = W (equivalently, A ≡ A ∨ ¬A). Then, p B (A) = 1.
(ii) Let {A i } i∈N be a family of propositions such that, for every k, l ∈ N ,
Proposition 5.2 shows indeed that, for every B ∈ Π + , p B is a probability measure on (Π, ¬, ∧, ∨). Moreover Bayes' theorem can easily be proved in our framework.
Proposition 5.3. Let A, B ∈ Π + . Then, the following equation holds.
Proof. Straightforward.
Examples. Let E, F ∈ E, R, S ∈ S, c, d ∈ C, and let α F d , α S ∈ Π + . Then, we obtain from Definition 5.2:
. Example (iii) is especially interesting because it shows that the µ-contextual conditional probabilities do not always depend on µ-contexts.
Let us observe now that the above introduction of a probability measure on L is purely formal. However, it can be intuitively justified by resorting to the picture of the world introduced in Section 3 when dealing with QM. Indeed, whenever states are interpreted as equivalence classes of preparation procedures, one can generalize the aforesaid picture and assume that activating a preparation procedure π produces an individual object that is in a given state S and, for every µ-context c, possesses a given set of properties depending on c, thus determining a truth assignment on L. Activating again π produces another individual object that still is in the state S, but generally possesses a different set of properties for some c ∈ C, because we cannot control the preparation procedure at a microscopic level (see (ii) in Section 3), thus determining a truth assignment on L that differs from the previous one. Given a universe U of individual objects, we can then maintain that every individual object can be associated with a truth assignment on L and that this correspondence is, generally, many-to-one. Let us roughly reason in finite terms (we are only looking for an intuitive justification of our mathematical structure here) and let us consider the set Ext(α S ) of all truth assignments that assign the value t (true) to the atomic proposition α S stating that the entity H is in the state S (see Section 4). Then, we can assign a weight to α S that is proportional to the number of individual objects that are associated with truth assignments in Ext(α S ). Furthermore, similar procedures lead to assign a weight to the atomic proposition α Ec stating that the entity H has the property E in the µ-context c. Hence a weight can be assigned to all propositions of L following obvious rules. It is thus apparent that the Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 formalize this idea.
Whenever the above intuitive justification of the µ-contextual probability structure on L is accepted, such structure can be seen as a theoretical expression of the source of randomness described in Section 3, (ii), and it is important to stress that it is basically classical. Hence µ-contextual conditional probabilities admit an epistemic interpretation. In other words, they can be considered as indexes of our lack of knowledge of the truth assignments on Π. In the framework of a theory T ∈ T characterized by the pair (F, I) (see Section 2), it may occur that these probabilities can be evaluated by using the laws of T . But, generally, they cannot be tested. Indeed, one cannot know the physical situation at a microscopic level, hence the µ-contexts associated, via I, with it. Therefore, µ-contextual probabilities must be considered as theoretical entities that can be empirically interpreted only indirectly (see again Section 2). The next Section is then devoted to discuss this issue in greater detail.
Measurements and mean probabilities
The predictions of a fully developed scientific theory are usually checked by means of measurements whose theoretical description is part of the theoretical language of the theory. In the present paper we are interested in the theories in which µ-contexts and tests of probabilities are introduced. Hence, the formal apparatus of each theory of this kind must include not only a µ-contextual probability structure on L, but also a theoretical description of the measurements that correspond to tests of probabilities via the empirical interpretation of the theory (see Setion 2). The physical preliminaries in Section 3 then provide us again with some important suggestions. Firstly, a measurement may refer to more than one atomic proposition simultaneously. Secondly, the theoretical description must consider a subset of µ-contexts that correspond to the possible microscopic empirical situations underlying the test of probability. Thirdly, a probability measure must be defined on the foregoing subset of µ-contexts to take into account our limited knowledge of the microscopic empirical situation when a test of probability is performed.
Bearing in mind the requirements above, we introduce the definition that follows.
Definition 6.1. We denote by T µM the subclass of T µ characterized by the following conditions.
(i) For every T ∈ T µM , a µ-contextual probability structure on L is defined.
(ii) For every T ∈ T µM , every E ∈ E is associated with a set M E of measurement procedures, and every M ∈ M E determines a macroscopic measurement context C M associated with a classical probability space
Generally, however, a test of probability refers to non-atomic (i.e. molecular) propositions, which may require considering several atomic propositions (hence several states, properties and µ-contexts) simultaneously, consistently with the first suggestion above. We are thus naturally led to introduce the notions of compatibility, testability and joint testability as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let us consider a theory T ∈ T µM and a non-empty countable set {E, F, ...} ∈ P(E) of properties of L. We say that E, F, .
Moreover, for every A ∈ Π, let E A = {E, F, ...} be the (finite) set of all the properties that occur (as indexes) in the formal expression of A (together with indexes in C). We say that A is testable (in T ) iff the following conditions hold.
(i) No atomic state proposition occurs in A (hence E A = ∅). Then, we denote by Π τ the set of all testable propositions of Π, and for every A ∈ Π τ we write A(c) in place of A whenever explicit reference to the µ-context c defined in (iii) must be done.
Finally, let {A, B, ...} be a non-empty finite set of propositions of Π τ . We say that A, B, ... are jointly testable (in T ) iff the proposition A ∨ B ∨ ... is testable.
Based on Definition 6.2 we state the following proposition. Proposition 6.1. Let T ∈ T µM . Then, the following statements hold in T .
(i) Let us denote by k the binary compatibility relation on E defined by setting for every E, F ∈ E, EkF iff E and F are compatible.
Then, k is reflexive and symmetric, but, generally, not transitive.
Proof. Straightforward.
It remains to understand what one actually checks by means of a test of probability performed by means of a measurement procedure M ∈ M E ∩ M F ∩ ...(to be precise, by means of the empirical measurement procedure corresponding to M via an empirical interpretation). Therefore, let us resort again to the intuitive picture sketched in Section 3 with reference to QM. Such a picture suggests that, if a measurement is performed of the (compatible) properties E, F, ... that occur in a proposition A(c) ∈ Π τ by means of a measurement procedure M ∈ M E ∩ M F ∩ ..., then a µ-context occurs which one cannot control. Hence one cannot know whether the measurement allows to know the truth value of A(c) or the truth value of another proposition A(c ′ ) ∈ A. When the measurement is iterated, we obtain frequencies that approach a mean over A (hence over C M ), in the large number limit, of the µ-contextual conditional probabilities defined in Section 5.
We add that we are generally interested in a class of theories in which all tests corresponding to measurement procedures that belong to M E ∩ M F ∩ ... yield the same results, which requires that such procedures be probabilistically equivalent (e.g., the registering devices considered in Section 3).
The following definition formalizes the above ideas.
Definition 6.3. Let T ∈ T µM , let Π S = {A ∈ Π | E A = ∅} be the set of all propositions in which no symbol of property occurs (briefly, state-propositions), and let A, B ∈ Π τ ∪Π S , with A and B jointly testable whenever they both belong to Π τ . Then we introduce the following averages of µ-contextual probabilities.
( By referring to Definition 6.3 we can maintain that, for every T ∈ T µMP , the empirical interpretation makes M correspond to a mean probability test that produces an outcome which is expected to coincide with < p(A | B) >. Of course, the actual results never fulfil this expectation exactly, and it is a difficult task to decide what the disagreement means (it can be considered so small that T is confirmed, or so big that T is falsified, or it can be attributed to flaws in the preparing and registering devices, etc.). However, we will not deal with this issue here.
We stress that mean conditional probabilities are introduced in a Kolmogorovian framework to take into account two different kinds of ignorance. First, the lack of knowledge about the truth assignments on Π mentioned at the end of Section 5. Second, the ignorance of the µ-contexts to be associated with a probability test. Hence mean conditional probabilities admit an epistemic interpretation. Notwithstanding this, they are not bound to satisfy Kolmogorov's assumptions, for they are average quantities. In particular, it follows from Definition 6.3 that < p(A) >< p(A | B) > is generally different from < p(B) >< p(B | A) >. Hence a formal analogous of the Bayes theorem does not hold in the case of mean conditional probabilities.
Finally, let us observe that the above definition of mean conditional probabilities and mean probability tests are conceptually similar to the universal averages and the universal measurements, respectively, introduced by Sassoli de Bianchi (2014, 2017) . Moreover the recognition that two kinds of lack of knowledge occur when a measurement is performed also recalls the perspective proposed by these authors. As we have anticipated in Section 1, we therefore make a brief comparison of our approach with Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi's in the Appendix.
Q-probability
The set E of all properties is fundamental in every T ∈ T µMP . We intend to focus on it in the present section and show that the notions and definitions in Section 6 allow to define, whenever some conditions on mean conditional probabilities are satisfied, a family of quantum-like probability measures on E parametrized by the set of all states. To reach our aim, let us preliminarily recall that, for all E ∈ E, M ∈ M E and c ∈ C M , α Ec belongs to Π τ because of Proposition 6.1, (ii). Then we introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.1. Let us consider a theory T ∈ T µMP , let E ∈ E, M ∈ M E , c ∈ C M , S ∈ S, and let P S (E) be the mean conditional probability of α Ec given α S , that is,
. Then, we denote by ≺ and ≈ the preorder and the equivalence relation on E, respectively, defined by setting, for every E, F ∈ E,
It is now important to consider a special case that allows to place physical theories as CM, SM and QM within the general framework constructed in Sections 4-6. To this end we introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.2. Let us consider a theory T ∈ T pMP such that ≺ is a partial order and (E, ≺) is an orthocomplemented lattice. We denote meet, join, orthocomplementation, least element and greatest element of (E, ≺) by ⋓, ⋒, ⊥ , O and U, respectively. Moreover, we denote by ⊥ the (binary) orthogonality relation canonically induced by ⊥ on (E, ⋓, ⋒ , ⊥ ) 9 . Then, for every S ∈ S, we say that the mapping
is a generalized probability measure on (E, ⋓, ⋒ , ⊥ ) iff it satisfies the following conditions.
(i) P S (U) = 1.
(ii) If {E i } i∈N is a family of properties that are pairwise disjoint (i.e., for every k, l ∈ N , E k ⊥E l ), then
Let E ∈ E. Whenever P S is a generalized probability measure on (E, ⋓,⋒, ⊥ ), we say that P S (E) is the q-probability of E given S.
Definition 7.2 implies that a generalized probability measure P S is a classical probability measure only if (E, ⋓, ⋒ , ⊥ ) is a Boolean lattice. Hence, generally, 9 We recall that ⊥ is a unary operation on (E, ≺) such that, for every E, F ∈ E,
Then ⊥ is the non-reflexive and symmetric binary relation on E defined by setting, for every E, F ∈ E, E⊥F iff E ≺ F ⊥ . P S does not satisfy Kolmogorov's assumptions. Nevertheless, the q-probability P S (E) of a property E ∈ E given S admits an epistemic interpretation and can be empirically tested, as it is a special case of the mean conditional probability introduced in Definition 6.3. It is then natural to wonder whether a conditional q-probability of a property E ∈ E given another property F ∈ E can be defined by means of P S , generalizing standard procedures in classical propositional logic. But if one tries to put
then the mapping
is not a generalized probability measure on (E, ⋓, ⋒ , ⊥ ) whenever this lattice is not boolean. Indeed, consider a property E = E 1 ⋒ E 2 , with E 1 , E 2 ∈ E and E 1 ⊥E 2 . We obtain
, which is generally different from
whenever (E, ⋓, ⋒ , ⊥ ) is not distributive.
One can, however, introduce a non-standard kind of conditional probability by considering mean probability tests performed in sequence rather than conjointly. Indeed one can again draw inspiration from QM and single out theories in T µMP where measurement procedures exist which correspond, via empirical interpretation, to mean probability tests that filter the sample of the entity that is considered in a prefixed way, producing a new sample on which the same or a different test can be performed. Moreover, still inspired by QM, we are interested in those mean probability tests that yield frequency 1 when repeated on the new sample. We therefore introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.3. Let us consider a theory T ∈ T pMP and for every E ∈ E let us put S E = {S ∈ S | P S (E) = 0}. Then we say that a measurement procedure M ∈ M E is of first kind iff it is associated with a mapping
such that P tE (S) (E) = 1. For every E ∈ E and first kind measurement procedure M ∈ M E we then put P S (F E) = P tE (S) (F ).
Moreover, let (E, ≺) be an orhocomplemented lattice in T and let P S and P tE (S) be generalized probability measures on (E, ≺). Then we say that P S (F E) is the conditional q-probability of F given E and S.
If a theory T ∈ T pMP contains a first kind measurement procedure M ∈ M E , then P S (F E) can be tested whenever S ∈ S E , as mean probability tests always exist for P tE (S) (F ) (see Section 6; however, no analogous of the Bayes theorem can be stated for conditional q-probabilities). Definition 7.3 thus introduces a non-standard conditional probability on (E, ≺) that can be tested and coexists with the µ-contextual conditional probability introduced in Definition 5.2, which instead cannot be tested directly and has the status of a purely theoretical notion.
Physical theories
The subclass T µMP of T MP has been introduced in Definition 6.3 mainly by bearing in mind QM (see Section 3). Nevertheless, some features of T µMP (as those listed in Definitions 6.1 and 6.4) do not occur explicitly in the standard formulation of QM. But if we assume that they underlie it, so that QM belongs to T µMP , we can explain some relevant aspects of QM in terms of the general notions characterizing T µMP and obtain a new perspective on quantum probability (see Section 1). Moreover, also CM and SM can be considered as theories belonging to T µMP , even if they represent very special cases in which all the notions introduced in the previous sections collapse into standard notions. We therefore discuss both CM and QM in the present section, leaving apart SM, whose treatment is obviously similar to the treatment of CM.
Classical mechanics
Let us begin by listing some basic features of CM, some of which can be deduced at once from the phase space representation of states and properties.
(i) CM deals with individual objects (see Remark 4.1), their (pure) states and (physical) properties. Both macroscopic and microscopic measurement contexts can be introduced in it and supplied with an intuitive (intended) interpretation, but it is assumed that each individual object either possesses or does not possess any property that is considered, independently of any measurement procedure.
(ii) Whenever the state S of an individual object x is given, the set of all properties possessed by x is determined by S, and it is different from the set of properties possessed by another individual object in a state S ′ different from S.
(iii) For every finite set {E, F, ...} of properties and individual object x, one can check, at least in principle, which properties in {E, F, ...} are possessed by x and which are not by performing an (exact) measurement that consists in measuring simultaneously E, F, ... .
(iv) Different properties can be assumed to have different phase space representations (grouping together empirically equivalent measurement procedures), hence they are not equivalent, in the sense that there are individual objects that possess one of them and not the other.
(v) Every negation of a property is a property, and every (finite) conjunction or disjunction of properties is a property (see, e.g., Garola and Sozzo, 2013) .
(vi) For every property E and individual object x, a measurement exists (at least as a limit of real measurements) which establishes whether x possesses or does not possess the property E without perturbing the state S of x.
Let us discuss now how the general notions introduced in Sections 4-7 specialize in the case of CM.
First of all, (i) implies that macroscopic and microscopic contexts play no role in the truth assignments on Π. Hence, for every w ∈ W , E ∈ E, C, D ∈ C, the equality w(α EC ) = w(α ED ) holds in CM, which implies α EC ≡ α ED (see Definition 4.2), Ext(α EC ) = Ext(α ED ) (see Definition 5.1) and ξ(Ext(α EC )) = ξ(Ext(α ED )) (see Definition 5.2). Therefore, we can drop any reference to µcontexts in the following. In particular, we write α E and Π a E in place of α EC and Π a EC , respectively, and notice that the mapping τ :
Secondly, (ii) implies that, for every w ∈ W and S ∈ S, the requirement w(α S ) = t determines the values of w on all (atomic and molecular) propositions of Π: in particular, w(α S ′ ) = f for every S ′ = S. Hence Ext(α S ) (see Definition 5.1) is a singleton, whose unique element we denote by w S . It follows from Definition 5.2 that, for every E ∈ E, p(α E | α S ) ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, every truth assignment on Π refers to individual objects in a state S, hence for every w ∈ W a state S ∈ S exists such that w = w S . Therefore, the mapping s : S −→W, S−→w S is bijective.
Thirdly, let us come to measurements. Then, (iii) implies that, for every countable set {E, F, ...} ∈ P(E), the properties E, F, ... are compatible in the sense established in Definition 6.2. Moreover, every proposition A ∈ Π such that no atomic state proposition occurs in it is testable, that is, A ∈ Π τ . Moreover, for every non-empty finite set {A, B, ...} ∈ P(Π τ ), the propositions A, B, ... are jointly testable and the result of an exact measurement neither depends on the macroscopic context nor on the µ-contexts. Therefore, for every A, B ∈ Π τ ∪Π S , if B ∈ Π + the mean conditional probability < p(A | B) > is defined (see Definition 6.3) and coincides with p(A | B). The notion of mean conditional probability thus reduces to the notion of conditional probability. Moreover, the mapping P S introduced in Definition 7.2 is such that, for every E ∈ E and S ∈ S,
The results obtained above imply that, for every E, F, ... ∈ E, E ≺ F (see Definition 7.1) iff α E < α F (see Definition 4.3). Indeed, let us recall that we have assumed in Definition 6.1 that, for every S ∈ S, α S ∈ Π + , hence ξ(Ext(α S )) = 0, which implies ξ({w S }) = 0 in CM. Therefore, for every E, F ∈ E, the following sequence of coimplications holds.
It follows that the order structures (E, ≺) and (Π a E , <) are isomorphic. Moreover, < and ≺ are partial orders. Indeed, (iv) implies that, for every E, F ∈ E, if E = F then there is a truth assignment w S which assigns the value t to one of the propositions α E and α F , and value f to the other. Hence α E ≡ α F iff α E = α F , which implies that < is a partial order on Π a E . Because of the aforesaid isomorphism, also ≺ is a partial order.
Let us consider now q-probability. Because of (v), (Π a E , <) is a Boolean lattice, hence (E, ≺) is a boolean lattice (whose meet, join and complementation we denote now, by abuse of language, by ∩, ∪ and c , respectively). Thus, for every S ∈ S, the q-probability P S is a classical probability measure on (E,∩, ∪, c ) (the proof of this statement follows at once from Proposition 5.2 because of the equality and isomorphism above). Therefore, for every E, F ∈ E, the conditional probability in the state S of E given F can be defined in a standard way, as follows
Finally, let us consider the conditional q-probability P S (E F ). Because of (vi), a first kind measurement procedure exists for every E ∈ E such that t E (see Definition 7.3) is the identity mapping. We obtain in this case that P S (E F ) = P tF (S) (E) = P S (E). This equality shows that P S (E F ) does not coincide with P S (E | F ) in CM, which illustrates the deep conceptual difference between standard conditional probability and conditional q-probability.
Quantum mechanics
At variance with CM, QM is a typical case of theory belonging to T in which macroscopic contexts play a basic role. To place QM within the general framework constructed in the previous sections, let us assume that QM belongs to T µMP (see Definition 6.3) and refer to the language L introduced in Section 4 for this class of theories. Let w ∈ W , E ∈ E, c, d ∈ C. Then, it may occur in QM that w(α Ec ) = w(α Ed ), which implies Ext(α Ec ) = Ext(α Ed ). Moreover, in Hibert space QM the following mathematical representation holds.
Entity H (physical system) −→ Hilbert space H. State S −→ Density operator ρ S on H. Property E −→ Orthogonal projection operator P E on H. Furthermore, the set of all orthogonal projection operators on H is an orthomodular lattice in which a partial order is defined independently of any probability measure. Hence, the representation above induces on E an order, which we denote by ≪, and (E, ≪) is an orthomodular lattice (the standard quantum logic mentioned in Section 1).
Born's rule then associates a probability value T r [ρ S P E ] (which does not depend on any context) with the pair (E, S). Hence a quantum probability
is defined which is said to be a generalized probability measure on (E, ≪) (see, e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981) , and the family {Q S } S∈S is ordering on (E, ≪) (ibidem), which means that the order induced by it on E coincides with ≪. Therefore, the lattice structure of (E, ≪) can be seen as induced by {Q S } S∈S . It follows that the order ≪ and the probability Q S can be considered as the specific forms that the order ≺ and the mapping P S , respectively, take in QM (see Definitions 7.1 and 7.2). We thus obtain in QM
Furthermore, if the quantum probability Q S replaces P S in the conditions (i) and (ii) stated in Definition 7.2, then these conditions are satisfied, which makes the above classification of Q S as generalized probability measure consistent with Definition 7.2. We thus obtain an interpretation of quantum probability measures that leads to consider them mean conditional probabilities. They can therefore be seen as derived notions within a Kolmogorovian framework, as we have anticipated in Section 1, which explains their non-classical character but shows that they admit an epistemic interpretation, at variance with their standard ontic interpretation (see Section 6). Hence our main goal in this paper has been achieved.
In addition, let us denote by κ the compatibility relation introduced in QM on the set of all properties by setting, for every pair (E, F ) of properties, EκF iff [P E , P F ] = 0. This relation is reflexive and symmetric but not transitive. Hence it can be considered as the specific form that the relation k introduced in Proposition 6.1 takes in QM.
Coming to measurements, let us recall that first kind measurement procedures exist in QM (see, e.g., Piron, 1976; Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981) and that the Lüders rule states that, whenever an (ideal), first kind measurement of a property E is performed on an ensemble described by ρ S , the subensemble that passes the measurement is described by the density operator PE ρ S PE T r[ρ S PE ] . Let us therefore denote by D (H) the set of all density operators on H. Then the mapping
can be considered as the specific form that the mapping t E introduced in Definition 7.3 takes in QM.
Finally, we recall that the conditional probability Q S (F | E), in a state S, of a property F given a property E, is defined in QM by referring to a measurement of F after a measurement of E on an ensemble described by ρ S , and is given by
. Hence this quantity can be considered as the specific form that the conditional q-probability of F given E and S introduced in Definition 7.3 takes in QM. We thus obtain
Conclusions
According to the perspective presented in this paper, mean probabilities that do not satisfy the assumptions of Kolmogorov's probability theory may occur within a Kolmogorovian probabilistic framework in several scientific theories as a consequence of contextuality. By assuming that QM belongs to this class, we obtain that quantum probability measures can be seen as mean conditional probabilities that have a non-classical structure but admit an epistemic interpretation, which challenges the standard ontic interpretation of quantum probability. In addition, we also obtain that some typical features of QM, i.e. the compatibility relation on the set of all physical properties and the quantum notion of conditional probability, are special cases of general notions that can be introduced whenever some links between contextuality and nonclassical probabilities are established.
We do not claim that our proposal leads to a complete solution of the quantum measurement problem, as we do not supply in our framework an explicit explanation of the reduction of the state vector carried out by a quantum measurement, nor avoid the "paradox" of nonlocality of QM (we coped instead with this problem in some previous papers, see, e.g., Garola 2015 and Garola et al., 2016) . However, the results resumed above are sufficient in our opinion to justify our approach to quantum probability. by considering the points within the Bloch sphere as representative of new pure states that do not occur in the standard formalism of QM. The action of an instrument measuring the spin of the physical system is then represented in the sphere by means of an elastic band connecting the north with the south pole of the sphere. When the measurement is performed, the state of the system moves orthogonally onto the elastic band and sticks to it. Then, the elastic band breaks in a point whose position on the band is unpredictable, leading the state either on the north pole (spin up) or on the south pole (spin down), depending on the position of the breaking point.
To make quantitative the above qualitative description of the measurement process, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi characterize the elastic band by means of a probability distribution whose value in a given point of the band is interpreted as the density of probability of breaking at that point. Moreover, when the measurement is repeated, the new elastic band may be different from the old one, and in this case it will be characterized by a different probability distribution. Hence, whenever the measurement is repeated many times, to predict the frequency of each possible outcome one must average over all probability distributions. The authors call this average universal average, and then call the measurement universal measurement. A quantum measurement of the spin of the physical system is then assumed to be a measurement of this kind.
The following remarks are now important.
(i) The experimenter can choose to perform a measurement but cannot choose the elastic band (at least if he takes every possible precaution to avoid influencing the outcome). The selection of the elastic band is instead assumed by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi to be the result of nondeterministic and unpredictable environmental fluctuations. Hence the elastic band corresponds to a potentiality region and physical quantities do not pre-exist to the measurement but are actualized by it. Therefore the authors consider quantum probability as ontic, which fits in well with the standard interpretation of QM.
(ii) In the description of the measuring process probability occurs twice. Firstly, when the elastic band is characterized by a probability distribution (probability 1 in the following). Secondly, when averaging over probability distributions to obtain a universal average (probability 2 in the following), which intuitively means that every possible distribution has the same probability to occur every time the measurement is repeated (because of (i) the experimenter does not influence in any way the "emerging" of the elastic band).
(iii) Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi's description of spin 1 2 measurements is not a hidden-variables theory in a standard sense. Indeed, it explains the randomness of the observed outcomes as a consequence of fluctuations in the measuring system, consistently with the Aerts' idea of hidden measurements mentioned above, rather than a consequence of our incomplete knowledge of the real state of the measured entity.
After constructing the above model, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi make a considerable effort to generalize it to physical entities whose measurements can give more than two possible outcomes. In this case the mathematical apparatus becomes much more complicated (in particular, the Bloch sphere becomes a hypersphere in a space with more than three dimensions and the elastic band is substituted by a hypermembrane). Nevertheless the basic features of spin 99 measurements pointed out above remain unchanged, hence we will refer to them in the following without entering the details of the general model.
Let us come to our approach. Here a canonical distinction between preparing and registering devices is introduced (Section 3) but no explicit model for the measurement process is proposed. Rather, a very simple picture assuming the existence of a microscopic world underlying the macroscopic world of our everyday experience is provided to justify our formalism intuitively (Section 5). According to this picture, we do not know what is going on at a microscopic level both in preparing and in registering devices. When considering the first kind of lack of knowledge, we are led to introduce a probability measure on the language L of the theories that we are considering, which takes the place of probability 1 in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi's description. Yet, in our approach this probability is introduced because the quantum description of the state of a physical system is maintained to be incomplete, according to the spirit of hidden variables theories (but only context-depending propositions occur in L, which implies that the "no go" theorems mentioned in footnote 1 do not apply): hence, it is interpreted as epistemic. When considering the second kind of lack of knowledge we are led instead to introduce µ-contexts (Section 4), which complies with the hidden measurements idea and parallels the introduction of the elastic band in Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi description. Mean conditional probabilities then parallel probability 2 . We, however, do not introduce any assumption of equiprobability (see (ii) above), which makes our approach slightly more general. More important, our mean conditional probabilities bear an epistemic interpretation, for they are classical weighted means of epistemic probabilities, at variance with Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi universal averages.
To close, let us recall that Aerts also introduced state property systems (see Aerts, 1999 and related bibliography) , which successively evolved in the statecontext-property (SCoP) formalism (see, e.g., Aerts and Gabora, 2005 ; such a formalism was mainly used for working out a theory of concepts, in particular in the field of quantum cognition). Then, the SCoP formalism can be (partially) translated into the formalism developed in the present paper, and conversely. Indeed, its basic structure can be summarized as follows.
(i) Fundamental notions: entity, state, (measurement) context, property (hence SCoP belongs to the class T, see Definition 4.1).
(ii) Fundamental definitions: set of states Σ, set of contexts M , set of properties L; entity (Σ, M, L, µ, ν), where µ : Σ×M ×Σ −→ [0, 1], (p, e, q) −→ µ(p, e, q) is a state-transition probability function that represents the likelihood to transition from the state p to the state q under the influence of the context e, and ν : Σ × L −→ [0, 1], (p, a) −→ ν(p, a) is a property-applicability function that estimates how applicable is the property a to the state p of the entity.
Then, based on the physical interpretation of the SCoP formalism, the following bijective correspondences with the formalism introduced in the present paper can be established.
c 1 : Σ −→ S, p −→ S,
